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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal 
from the judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, State of Utah, dated April 4, 2 006, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2-(2)(j). 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants take issue with the statement at p. 1, that it 
was the City's "understanding" that uthe as-applied challenge 
. . . has been distilled with the issue of whether the City' s 
amortization determination was arbitrary, capricious or 
alleged," and the further statement at p. 9 that "the City and 
the trial court reasonably believed that all issues . . . had 
been distilled into the amortization question." This 
understanding is without any support in the record and has 
certainly never been appellants' understanding. The clear and 
only record on the as-applied issue is set out and discussed 
at length at pp. 26-30 of appellants' brief. It was also 
dealt with at length and argued before the lower court in 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's (Proposed) Summary 
Judgment and Order of Dismissal (R114 9-53), in Defendant Provo 
City's Response (R1155-61) and in Plaintiffs' Reply (R1172-
94) . 
1 
Appellants' as-applied challenge has never been tied to 
the amortization issues. The as-applied issue is broader than 
the amortization issue. The appellants' claim that the 
amendment to Provo City's S-Overlay provisions is 
unenforceable as applied to property on the 9th East 
commercial corridor. Applying the amortization ordinance to 
the appellants' property does nothing to protect the relevant 
character of the neighborhood located to the east. 
Appellants' claims on this issue have never been heard. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The City's repeated references to "legislative 
intent" at page 9, as well as the statement at p. 9 that ua 
nonconforming use cannot be indefinite," and similar 
statements repeated at pp. 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20, for example, 
do not reference the ordinance or the record and neither 
provides any such reference. Rather, it is clear in the 
record, but not mentioned by the City, that until the Motion 
to Intervene was filed, the City was prepared to accept an 
indefinite amortization period for the M&S property. (R 920-
22; 1212 at pp. 39-40.) The City had approved M&S's permit 
for the improvements so was fully aware of M&S's recent large 
investment in, and its use of, the property before the 
2 
ordinance was enacted. Yet it made no provision in its 
amortization ordinance, as it could have done, to express 
either the "intent" now claimed by the City or to preclude an 
indefinite extension. In fact, the faithful application of 
the amortization formula to the M&S property requires an 
indefinite extension. The City's ingenuity in crafting 
numerous adjustments to that formula to achieve the result 
they now desire is without support and is not acceptable. 
2. As noted above, and in the Opening Brief of 
Appellant, the City, without any support whatsoever in the 
ordinance, took license in applying the clear and simple 
formula set forth in the ordinance to the M&S Property. The 
City wholly fails to explain the unsupported, arbitrary and 
inconsistent adjustments and elaborations it made to the 
ordinance formula in order to arrive at the predetermined 
amortization period. The license taken by the City in making 
those adjustments and elaborations are discussed in detail at 
pp. 12-15 of Appellant's opening Brief. For example, as the 
City concedes in its Statement of Facts, the City imported 
into the ordinance an "adjustment for inflation," use of a 
three-year period that had already expired, inconsistent use 
of the terms unet income," "reasonableness," a period of 
3 
"major construction/7 and the terms ufair market value," 
xxaverage monthly rental income," "net rental income/" none of 
which are defined or even referred to in the ordinance. 
Additional arbitrary terms and concepts cooked up by the City 
to achieve its desired result are set out in the opening Brief 
of Appellant at pp. 17-25. These politically motivated and 
selective manipulations have no proper place in the 
application of the clear terms of the ordinance to M&S's 
property. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Appellants do not claim that the basic terms of a 
settlement the City was willing to accept (R920-22) were ever 
reduced to an enforceable agreement. It is apparent, however, 
that except for the Intervenors' intervention, this case would 
have been resolved. The City believed it was in the best 
interests of its citizens that it be settled, that it had uthe 
right to settle" and that "we've got a reasonable settlement" 
(R 1212 at pp. 39-40) . And clearly it was the place and 
position of the City, rather than the Intervenors, to make 
that decision for the City. That being so, it was proper for 
the City to oppose their motion to intervene, as it did. Id. 
4 
2. The statement at p. 9 that "the nonconforming use 
cannot be indefinite," has no support in the ordinance and is 
contradicted by the City's acceptance of an indefinite period 
until the Intervenors applied political pressure (R 920-22) . 
Moreover, the ordinance could have included a provision to 
preclude an indefinite extension but it did not. M&S 
carefully followed the specific provisions of the ordinance; 
the City did not. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
1. Appellants' response supra to Point I, pp. 10-12, is 
covered in the response to appellee's summary of argument, at 
pp. 3-4 supra. 
2. Appellants' response to Point II.A. at pp. 13-15 is 
covered in appellants' combined Memorandum in Support of M&S 
Cox Investments, LC's Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Provo City's Motion for Summary Judgment, R 1105 
at pp. 1-4 (copy annexed hereto) and is not repeated here. 
3. As to Appellants' response to Point II.B. at pp. 15-
18, it must be noted again that the only evidence in the 
record as to any "legislative decision" or interest is the 
language of the ordinance itself. The claim at p. 16 that the 
5 
City could impose vxa reasonable amortization period" simply 
highlights the fact that no such condition is a part of the 
ordinance and the City's attempt to impose its unilateral view 
of a reasonable period to satisfy the political demands of the 
Intervenors was arbitrary and illegal. 
The authorities cited at p. 17 of Appellee's brief apply 
to ordinances whose terms are ambiguous but do not apply where 
the terms are clear and unambiguous as is the case here. 
The City's claim at p. 17 that appellants' position would 
render the ordinance meaningless or inoperable is without 
merit. In fact, the ordinance would still apply to give a 
specified exemption period in all appropriate cases. 
As to the term unet income," referred to at p. 18, the 
fact that the City chooses an interpretation different than 
M&S does not make that term ambiguous if the City's 
interpretation is not reasonable. The City's inconsistent 
application of the term demonstrates that its interpretation 
is clearly unreasonable. 
4. Response to Appellee's Point II.C. The central 
question here is not, as the City claims, whether the 22 year 
3-month amortization period is reasonable; it is whether the 
6 
City must follow the terms of its own ordinance. At p. 19 the 
City states, "though M&S and the Court might reach different 
conclusions, based on the figures which form the underlying 
facts . . . their conclusions are immaterial to the issue of 
whether the City's analysis and conclusions are reasonable." 
To say the figures are immaterial and don't matter is to admit 
the City's decision is arbitrary. 
The City's claim at p. 2 0 that "M&S's use of income and 
actual losses is 'primarily' to support an indefinite period" 
is misplaced. "Income and actual losses" are used by M&S to 
follow the terms of the ordinance. The terms "average past 
rental incomes," "actual rental value," "actual rental income" 
and "future rental values," used at p. 20, are conjured up and 
applied by the City without any support whatsoever in the 
ordinance or otherwise. Apparently, the City believes there 
is no limit to the terms and concepts it can create or invent 
and apply to the ordinance, without formal regulation or any 
other means of assuring consistency. It apparently believes 
that the meaning and effect of the ordinance are whatever it 
wants them to be in the circumstances. 
7 
As noted above, the investment by M&S and the use of the 
property for benefit of the Cox family was set and well known 
to the City long before the ordinance was passed. The fact 
M&M's that use resulted in a loss had nothing to do with the 
ordinance. The fact that the City is now under political 
pressure from the Intervenors should have no place in the 
City's duty to faithfully and objectively apply the terms of 
the ordinance as it was once willing to do without now 
attempting to arbitrarily manipulate the result. 
The reference at pp. 23-24 to "reasonable regulations'7 
brings to the fore the City's failure to adopt regulations and 
the City's inability to provide them when requested by 
appellants so they could comply with them. 
5. Appellants' response to Point III at pp. 23 is 
covered in Appellants' response to Appellee's Statement of the 
Case, supra. 
6. Appellants' response to appellee's Point IV at pp. 
26-28 is covered in the opening Brief of Appellant at pp. 30-
36. It was not the right or place of the Intervenors to 
override the City's efforts to resolve the issues with M&S. 
That is undeniably what the City administration is empowered 
8 
to resolve in the interest of all of its citizens rather than 
having to cater to the political demands of the Intervenors. 
The City's change of course after the intervention is 
unseemly. 
Annexed to this Reply Brief of Appellants is the 
affidavit of Reed L. Martineau confirming the statements 
referred to at the bottom of p. 23 and top of p. 24 and at p. 
29 of Appellants7 brief and challenged at p. 20 of Appellee's 
brief. The fact that the transcript omitted this part of 
counsel's opening statement was not known to counsel prior to 
review of the record on appeal. Accordingly, appellant moves 
the court to include these affidavits as a part of the record 
on appeal pursuant to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
For the City to claim as it does that the as-applied 
issue had not been raised early and fully both in the lower 
court and in Appellants' brief here, and to imply that it has 
been waived by appellant, is beyond surprising. The statement 
referred to above was made in open court and could not have 
been misunderstood by either the court or counsel. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
The City's arbitrary crafting and application of one 
ingenious term and concept after another to support its 
unseemly effort to justify its reversal of position and 
rewrite its simple ordinance to achieve the political result 
demanded by the Intervenors should not be affirmed. 
Appellants seek a proper application of the simple, straight 
forward terms of the ordinance that entitles them to an 
indefinite amortization period. 
DATED this j> day of March, 2007. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
_ ^
 m M „ __^c^-^ 
B y , ^ ^
 : 
Reea L. Martmeau 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
M&S Cox Investments, LC, Mervyn Cox 
and Sue Cox 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Record on Appeal, pages 1078 through 1081. 
2. Affidavit of Reed L. Martineau. 
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T a b l 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Provo City Was Required to Liberally Construe the 
Ordinance in Favor of M&S. 
Utah courts have repeatedly held that zoning ordinances must be 
strictly construed against the restrictive use of property and 
liberally construed in favor of an owner's desired use of property. 
See, e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, 131, 104 P.3d 
1208; Brown v. Sandy Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P. 2d 207, 210 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Patterson v. Utah 
County Bd. of Adjustment: 
[Bjecause zoning ordinances are in derogation of a 
property owner's common-law right to unrestricted 
use of his or her property, provisions therein 
restricting property uses should be strictly 
construed, and provisions permitting property uses 
should be liberally construed in favor of the 
property owner. 
893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah 1995). 
This expressed preference for the rights of the land-owner 
gives rise to a less deferential standard when courts review a 
City's zoning decisions. A Utah court 
will not defer to [a zoning board's] decision where 
the board failed to base the decision on evidence 
that could reasonably support the use, or where the 
decision was made based on an incorrect 
understanding or application of a statute or 
ordinance, even if the incorrect understanding or 
application was reasonable or consistent with prior 
board application. 
1 
Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P. 2d 2 07 21 0 5 ;i Jl :ah 
Ct. App. 1998). Because of this policy, "the lav/ in Utah is clear 
that interpretation of the rnenniriff »•• f• ,-oninrf ordinarif
 )>;:, by { board 
of adjustment is not entitled to deference." Id. 
T hi i s 11 i i 3 C' i) i :i : I : 3 1 i : • i ] I g i E; t I : i 1 e f e r en c e \ 1 : • : 1 1 I e B < ::»a i: d < :> f 
Adjustment's interpretation of the amortization provisions of the 
O V T V ^ • •<*( •:•_:; •• ':na-v:e. • • ^ i ; i - - , liberal 
construction of. the Ordinance that favors the owner's desired use of 
t';io •: 'Opo.;: cy . 
B
• Where an Appellant Claims that a Board of Adjustment 
Decision Violates an Ordinance, a Utah Court Reviews the 
Decision for Correctness. 
Utah law charges this Court with inquiri ng whether the Board of 
Adjustmei it's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal " .See 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-a-801 (3) (a) (ii) . A determination of 
illegality requires a determination that the decision violates 
a law, statute or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was 
made . " rr? a f n ^ f ^ ) Where a Board of Adjustment's decision 
is claimed to violate an ordinance, the Court reviews the dec: si oi I 
"for correctness," applying only a level of "non-binding deference." 
See Sa\ re Oi i Can 7011s ; ,B< oa 2 < i of Ad ji istn le nt of 5 3 11 1 3 ?<:« 3 Coi int y, 
2 0 0 5 UT App 2 8 5 , I 3 2 , 116 P . 3 d 9 7 8 , 9 8 3 . Thi s low 1 eve 1 o f 
d e f e r ei: i ce i s app II :i e d s o a s : 1 : t t: : c- :)].<:,;• i t l le Co in t::s t i : ad 2 t i 01 1a ] 
2 
role of interpreting legislatioi 1 , i 1 c )n-expert n: 11 11 :i ic i p, i] ] )oards 
comprised primarily 01 laymen. See Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98, 31 *d, 104 r. " •' * Becai ise M&S al leges ti lat the Board 
of Adjustment's decision violates Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, this 
Court shoi lid re^ n ew the decisi oi i f « :>. correct! less , applying only non-
binding deference. See id,3 
I PROVO CITY'S INCONSISTENT Afi.-'iJ.LUAT±ON OF ITS OWN FORMULA 
VIOLATED THE ORDINANCE. 
The amortization calculation performed by the City ' r. y \'w 
case was characterized by ad nc , . • r^-a <^- . .,. •-
making. These defects contributed to a decision that violated the 
Ordinance and exhib-i <VJ •' > '.;' ; ' - ;- * -
 : .voznment 
action. See, e.g., ~-TcGowan <\ Mississippi State oil & Gas Bd. , 604 
Sn . 2d 11 2 , 3 2 2 (Mj ss ] 9 92 ) ( s tat:i i lg ti lat ar b:i tr ai: y and capricious 
review "condemns ad hoc decision-making") ; Ii it" I Snowmobile Mfrs. 
Ass > ^nrtcr ' ' I I' : ipp./M \AJ\1, l.!n I il 1.,. . J (J U 4} (stating 
that "prejudged political decisions" are arbitrary and capricious). 
3 p r o v o city has submittea :„dt the proper standard of review is 
actually the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. While M&S 
submits that the Board of Adjustment's decision must be reviewed 
ufor correctness," it also submits that if the Court should adopt 
the more deferential standard, the Board's decision must still be 
overturned. As argued below, the decision exhibits classic 
symptoms of arbitrariness and caprice, and therefore cannot survive 
under either standard of review. 
3 
The city's i n cor r e c t: a n d a r b i t: r a i: y c a ] c i i ] a t i « :»i 1 s a n d i t: s i a t i < D I i a 1 e s 
therefor are rebutted specifically below. 
A. The city Achieved Its Desired Result by .I J" ; i i " .g Two 
Different Figures for the Same "Net Income" Cc ncei >t. 
Provo City argues that "net income from, the property" is an 
ambiguous phrase in need of further clari fi cat :i 01 i f t: « : >i i: i. 1 :1 i E • C« DI 1. t : t: 
See Provo City Memo, in Support, p. 1 4, ¥ et there is no dispute 
between the pax tier, d;-<- >> '^ini . : t:l i- E t< EM rn Tl le d:i spi ite 
about the definition on uner; income'' is within Provo City itself. 
The C \ , , - [ g:i ; e i :i :i t t: :, , c :i :i f f ei: ei it 
interpretations and applications. According to the City, in one 
^*^ig.' • - - i)r. ijp-jx iy • means net 
rental receipts nor four and a half years, between 1996 and •dd-
dee Mar cl i 8 2 00 i « 3 ai li ce Lar sen Memo, p. 2, section 5. "The 
result is ($27,004.60) , a negative number. In a different part of 
the l.oLiuuLa, " I P ! income trom the property" means only net rental 
receiots for 1999, thp first six months of 2000, and hypothetical 
orojec;iea r.ucure rennal receipts for the remaining six months of 
2 0 00. See March 8, 2004 Janice Larsen Memo, p. 2, section 6. The 
result ijj ^ J L, 4 2.06, a number almost $60,0 00 greater than the 
first. 
By employing its "net income-plus" figure in the calculation of 
M fr R ' s a v o r a q P t r i M M t •} \ 1 y i fill a .1 :i i i c c: m e, t h e C i t y a s s u r e d 11 i a t M & S s 
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Classification No. 
MARTINA* TT 
STATE OF I JTAH ) 
ss i 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1 I am ai i attorney licensed to practice in the State of 
Utah and before this Court, 
J-. n i L _3 JL / / , 2 0 C 5 , I r ep r e s e i 11 e d 11 I e p 1 a i i 11 i f f s 
appellants in a hoaring before the Honorable Steven I i, Hansen on 
reciprocal motions for summary judgment of plaintiffs-appellants 
::-a • :• : ijlAij.ii:-,- L L^i L f v :_• Pi: o v o C:i t/;: > Cor p o r a t J oi i. 
3 \ Jhen directed by the Court to present the argument for 
plaintiff-appellants, I began by first stating clearly to the 
i II,C :i i :i :i s s u e s r e t na i i ie d :i i i 11 ie ] <= ; J s u :i t , :i E 11 i e "l a s -
a p p 1 i e d " i s s u e s a n d t h e " Amo r t j z a t :i o i i,/ :i s s i i e s a n d a dv i s e d t h e 
Court that only the Amortization issues, and not the applied 
issues, were before the Court for argument. 
3 I purposely made this statement at the beginning of n ly 
a i: g u i i: L e i 11 t o e i [ ip 1 i a size M & S ' s p o s i t i o i i 11 i at the as-applied issues 
had not been raised by motion, argued or ruled on. 
4 Opposing counsel made no reply or objection to that 
statement. 
ns noted in footnote 5 on page 24 of the Brief of 
Appellee, the transcript or "•i,-;r hearing n.-A^n that "the 
b e g : . , • •• •• - - a \-.v : • 
request that, pursuant >_ iviJ.e . • ih) Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, i;his Affidavit be made a part of the record. 
statement niacin ^n cho i3rief or. Appeliair: ana intimates that such 
a statement was not made. 
DATED this 2^<^day of March, 2007. 
£^ds£<CJt*^C*£€~ 4S2L*C~ 
Re ed L. Mart i ne au 
l i s (7 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thi  <Z_ day of March, 
:ommiss: My Commission Expires: v Residing at: nfljl^ (ol^ll ([I'.i.^ 
1 
•2- i w *; ••/ 
